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Viewing cable 06MEXICO1889, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD'S

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06MEXICO1889**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MEXICO1889	2006-04-10 19:22	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Mexico

Appears in these articles:

<http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/estrategias-para-combatir-el-terrorismo>

VZCZCXRO8496
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #1889/01 1001922
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101922Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0160
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM

60015
2006-04-10 19:22:00
06MEXICO1889
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0160
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016

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SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD'S
APRIL 17-18 VISIT TO MEXICO

Classified By: Ambassador Antonio O. Garza for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Mexico is the essential partner in U.S. homeland defense, and while the Mexican Navy (Marina) has been an enthusiastic player, the Mexican military (SEDENA) has only recently begun to acknowledge the benefits of cooperation. This visit marks the opportunity to realign our own posture vis-a-vis Mexico to give it the stature it merits in our own security strategies, but also to build Mexico's acceptance of its strategic role in North America. What we do in the coming months is crucial foundation for the military-to-military opportunities we can forge with Mexico's incoming civilian and military leaders. End Summary

Two Services, Two Approaches

¶2. (C) Mexico generally remains cognizant of historical military confrontations with the U.S. and extremely sensitive to perceived slights or embarrassments. Within the military Marina has been most able to overcome that, especially post 9/11, and has quickly embraced the need for close cooperation on counter-terrorism, narcotics interdiction, potential interception of weapons of mass destruction, and the range of missions necessary to keep North America secure. SEDENA has traditionally been suspicious and aloof, in part to disguise lack of capability. In recent months, however, we have seen a new openness within SEDENA to accepting a relationship with NORTHCOM, observing U.S. military exercises, and of course providing unprecedented assistance during Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. This visit gives us the opportunity to recognize Marina's ongoing partnership and open the door to a similar relationship with SEDENA. The tools we suggest:

-- Waiver for American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA)/Nethercutt Sanctions: Mexico ratified the Treaty of Rome in 2005, and as required by ASPA/Nethercutt we have terminated ESF, IMET and FMF, the latter two targeted primarily towards Marina. These programs were essential to Marina's counter-terrorism preparedness which benefits not only Mexico but the U.S. President Fox, Foreign Minister Derbez, and both houses of the Mexican Congress have resolved not to sign an Article 98 agreement with the U.S. A waiver directly serves our security interests.

-- Major Non-NATO Ally Status: President Bush met last week with President Fox and Canadian Prime Minister Harper to discuss regional security and prosperity. Our regional security efforts are enhanced if all three partners have the opportunity and responsibility to be equal players. The U.S. and Canada are, of course, NATO members. Making Mexico a Major Non-NATO Ally opens up additional resources for cooperation, training and engagement. It also provides Mexico with a status nearer to that of Canada and the U.S. -- and a greater responsibility to improve its capabilities to meet the common standard. While the foreign Ministry (SRE) has signalled sensitivity to becoming a formal "ally" of the United States, careful explanation of what being a Major Non-NATO Ally entails should help mitigate that. We have informally raised this with military leaders who have encouraged us to raise the possibility with President Fox.

-- Joint Political-Military Talks: Mexico is one of the few countries in the region to still have a military Defense Secretary, and that is unlikely to change soon. As our

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homeland security, disaster relief and counter-terrorism missions and scenarios bridge the military and civilian sectors, we believe building dialogue and cooperation between civilian and military experts is a valuable tool for both countries. Mexico has just scheduled Pol-Mil talks with Canada, setting a precedent we would like to follow.

Non-Proliferation

¶3. (C) Mexico is generally a strong proponent of non-proliferation. In January it signed the International Convention for the Repression of Nuclear Terrorist Acts. We have pressed the Secretary of Foreign Relations to endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative, (PSI), so far without result although they have not raised specific objections. .

Political Constraints

¶4. (C) Mexico is in the last two months of an historic presidential campaign which any one of the three major parties could win -- polls have them in a technical tie at this point. The outcome is unlikely to change military missions dramatically: All three presidential candidates favor continued military participation in drug eradication and interdiction, and have postulated an increased military role in border security. Two of the three candidates would

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probably continue Mexico's resistance to getting involved in international peacekeeping operations. If the National Action Party (PAN) is re-elected it would certainly press for a greater military role in PKOs. Regardless of who wins, General Vega will resign and the incoming president will select a new Secretary of Defense from the ranks of the lieutenant generals (generales de division). Under General Vega SEDENA has suggested it is politicians who set constraints on what the military can do. However, in the last year NORTHCOM has hosted two Mexican Senate delegations the members of which seemed very open to increased engagement with the U.S. A new Mexican Secretary of Defense may provide us the opportunity to open up unprecedented military cooperation with Mexico if we have put the tools in place.

¶5. (C) These are crucial last months of the Fox administration, as the Mexican President looks to fortify his legacy as the leader who brought democratic transition and modernization to Mexico. Fox must be politically cautious not to "surrender" to the U.S. He is also eager for recognition for his administration's unprecedented counter-terrorism and security cooperation with us. Spiraling violence on the border shadows real progress on other fronts. The three initiatives suggested above could find a receptive audience with President Fox, and could lay the foundation for a new, invigorated military-to-military relationship with the incoming administration.

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity>

GARZA